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One part of the policy response in many countries to increasing
pension coverage will be greater private provision on the part of
individuals. This requires that individuals are well informed about
pensions. In this article, we assess levels of knowledge of pensions
using a representative sample of older Irish adults. We find that
two-thirds of individuals enrolled in pension schemes do not know
what amount will be paid out on retirement and/or whether the
payments will be in the form of lump sums, monthly payments,
or both. One policy implication is the need for increased informa-
tion to be directed at certain groups, in particular, women and less
educated people. More fundamentally, the results suggest that the
mandatory elements in pension systems should be extended.
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INTRODUCTION
A major policy concern for many governments in Europe (and beyond)
is how to ensure that national pension systems are both adequate and
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financially sustainable. This concern has existed for a number of years with
adequacy and sustainability being threatened by population aging. However,
the global economic crisis of recent years has heightened concerns due to
factors such as fiscal crises that affected many countries.
In countries such as Ireland and the United Kingdom, governments have
tended to look to the private sector as the route to boost pension saving,
typically through occupation-based pension plans. According to the OECD,
“Voluntary private provision for old age will become increasingly important
in a range of other countries as future public benefits have been cut back”
(OECD, 2012, p. 24). In looking to the private system to play an enhanced
role in pension provision, policy makers in Ireland, the United Kingdom,
and elsewhere are looking to individuals to take greater roles in pension-
related decisions, often through the schemes offered by employers. While
participation in state pension schemes is mandatory for employees through
social insurance contributions, participation in occupational schemes outside
of the public sector is often voluntary, as is participation in other forms of
private pension saving arrangements. Given this increased role for private
and hence voluntary arrangements, a question arises over whether people
are well equipped to make good decisions regarding their future pension
needs.
According to simple economics models, rational and forward-looking
individuals will make optimal decisions on intertemporal allocation of
resources if they have perfect knowledge of the pension system. In reality,
knowledge is often imperfect because the information required for decision
making is extensive and the system is very complex, with various orga-
nizations contributing to the possible options available to people. There
is substantial involvement by the state through the social welfare system,
the pension regulatory system, and the taxation system. Employers are also
involved through their sponsorship of occupational pension schemes, as are
personal pension providers. This complexity poses significant problems and
difficulties for those planning for retirement. The knowledge and understand-
ing of the system that individuals accumulate depend on a number of factors
including the quantity/quality of information acquired at the workplace and
from family members and peers, personal analytical abilities, and personal
rate of time preferences (discount rates, myopia).
In this paper, we aim to explore the levels and patterns of knowl-
edge of a private pensions system. We use the first wave of The Irish
Longitudinal Study on Ageing (TILDA), which is a nationally representative
study of people aged 50+ residing in Ireland. This data set is particularly well
suited for our analysis because it includes a module on retirement planning.
Respondents are asked a battery of questions about their pension arrange-
ments, including questions on the form that future pension will be paid
and the likely amount. When asked, participants are given the option of
providing a response of “don’t know.”
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We investigate the level of “don’t know” responses and also the char-
acteristics of those who give “don’t know” responses when asked about the
form in which their supplementary pensions will be paid and/or how much
these pensions will pay out on retirement. We find that around two-thirds
of individuals who are making supplementary contributions are not able to
estimate the form and/or amount of their pension benefits in retirement.
Imperfect knowledge is higher for those who are poorly educated, female,
younger, and living in rural areas. In terms of policy conclusions, the remark-
ably high numbers of “don’t know” suggest that caution should be exercised
by governments that plan on following Ireland and the United Kingdom in
relying more heavily on voluntary private pension arrangement.
The paper is structured as follows: We first highlight the key features
of Ireland’s pension system and discuss the literature in this area. We then
describe the data, outline the model employed in the analysis, and report
the results. Finally, we provide some conclusions.
THE IRISH PENSION SYSTEM
The Irish pension system is composed of three basic pillars. The first pillar is
the state social welfare system that provides a range of payments such as the
State Pension. Entitlement to these payments is based either on contributions
collected through the Pay-Related Social Insurance system or on a means test.
The second pillar is occupational pensions, that is, pension schemes orga-
nized by employers as a service to their employees. These vary considerably
in their organization and benefits. About one-third of occupational scheme
members are in a defined contribution (DC) scheme, while two-thirds are
covered by a defined-benefit (DB) basis.1 The quality of these schemes also
varies in terms, for instance, of the size of the pension promised and the
manner in which it is indexed. The pensions provided for workers in the
public sector are distinctive in that in most cases they operate on a “pay as
you go” basis and tend to be more generous than the private sector schemes.
The third pillar covers personal pensions, that is, pensions arranged by
individuals on their own behalf through a pension provider. A new type of
personal pension called a personal retirement savings account (PRSA) was
introduced in 2002 to encourage more people to make individual provision
for retirement. Employers who do not provide staff with an occupational
pension are obliged to offer them the option of a PRSA arranged through the
firm.
Under pension legislation in Ireland, there are regulations setting out
the information that must be sent annually to members of both DC and DB
systems. The majority of these regulations is contained in the Occupational
Pension Schemes (Disclosure of Information) Regulations, 2006, and com-
prehensive guidance notes are provided by the state’s pension regulator
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(Pensions Board, 2012). Under these regulations, there is a requirement to
provide estimates of monthly payments that scheme members will receive
upon retirement. In the case of DC schemes, the estimate is based on
assumed rates of fund growth and future contributions. Compliance with
these regulations is essentially universal. This is an important point because
it shows that people are provided with details of their pensions, whether DB
or DC. Hence, any lack of knowledge on their part results from a failure to
engage with the information being provided.
LITERATURE REVIEW
A first strand of the literature has investigated the extent to which older indi-
viduals plan for their retirement. Using data from the Health and Retirement
Study in the United States, Gustman and Steinmeier (2005) investigated
knowledge about future pension benefits by comparing respondent reports
with benefits calculated from Social Security records and employer pension
plan descriptions. They found that around half of respondents were unable
to report their expected pension benefits. Also, only half of those who
reported a figure reported a value that fell within 25% of the measure calcu-
lated from Social Security records and employer pension plan descriptions.
The authors also found that those who were least likely to know about their
future pension benefits were poorly educated, women, and Black. On the
other hand, those who had spoken with friends about retirement, were self-
reported to be in poor health, and belonged to the top deciles of the earnings
distribution were more likely to have better information about their future
pensions.
More recently, Crawford and Tetlow (2012) investigated knowledge
about future pension benefits among older English individuals using data
from the English Longitudinal Study on Ageing. They found that over half
of individuals aged 50 to 64 who were not yet retired at the time of inter-
view had never thought about how many years of retirement they might
need to finance. Crawford and Tetlow (2012) also found that only half of
private pension scheme holders were able to report the exact amount they
expected to get at retirement. This figure was higher for DB scheme holders
(59%) than for DC scheme holders (45%). The authors highlighted that these
figures might have overstated individuals’ knowledge because respondents
were advised to get out any paperwork they had relating to their finances,
including statements from pension schemes.
Another strand of the literature has investigated the extent to which indi-
viduals can estimate with precision replacement rates, that is, the expected
ratio of the first pension to the last (permanent) salary. For example, Maunu
(2007) used information from a question taken from the 2005 wave of
the Finnish Household Wealth Survey in which respondents were asked
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to estimate the monthly amount of old-age pension they were expecting
to receive at the time of retirement. Maunu (2007) expected most informed
individuals to know that the target level of pension benefits was around
60% of their earnings, which is a rule of thumb in the Finnish system. The
author found that, although variation was high, most individuals did expect
to get a replacement rate near 60%. In a similar paper, Bottazzi, Jappelli,
and Padula (2006) found that in the 1990s and early 2000s the expectation
errors with respect to replacement rates of Italian workers were overall small
(in the range of 3%) and lower for individuals who were older, more experi-
enced, and working in the public sector. It is worth noting that the papers by
Maunu (2007) and Bottazzi and colleagues (2006) focused on expectations of
replacement rates based on old-age pensions and not on occupational and
private pensions. For obvious reasons, this reduces the degree of uncertainty
in individuals’ expectations.
A final strand of the literature has investigated how financial literacy
affects planning for retirement, and evidence has been collected in the
United States, England, the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, Sweden, Japan,
New Zealand, Russia, and Europe as a whole (Alessie, Van Rooij, & Lusardi,
2011; Almenberg & Säve-Söderbergh, 2011; Banks & Oldfield, 2007; Bucher-
Koenen & Lusardi, 2011; Christelis, Jappelli, & Padula, 2010; Crossan, Feslier,
& Hurnard, 2011; Fornero & Monticone, 2011; Klapper & Panos, 2011;
Lusardi & Mitchell, 2011; Sekita, 2011). In the surveys employed in these
empirical papers, financial literacy was measured by asking respondents
to carry out elementary calculations related to concepts such as interest
compounding, inflation, and risk diversification. These studies found that
financial literacy and retirement planning are closely related and that there
is a potentially important role for financial literacy in shaping retirement
planning (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2011, p. 503).
DATA
We use data from the first wave (2010) of TILDA, which is a nationally
representative study of people aged 50+ residing in Ireland. The study is
closely harmonized with other leading international studies of aging such as
The English Longitudinal Study of Ageing; the Survey of Health, Ageing, and
Retirement in Europe; and the Health and Retirement Study in the United
States.
Data collection in TILDA is made of three components: (1) a computer-
aided personal interview questionnaire; (2) a self-completion questionnaire,
designed to explore certain areas considered particularly sensitive for respon-
dents to answer directly to an interviewer; and (3) a comprehensive health
assessment. A total of 8,504 individuals (8,175 aged 50+ and 329 younger
partners of eligible individuals) were recruited at wave 1, and a household
response rate of 62% was achieved.
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TILDA includes a module that deals with the arrangements people are
making to provide for their retirement. Private and public sector employ-
ees are asked whether they are (1) members of an occupational pension
scheme organized by their current employer; (2) members of a PRSA scheme
organized through their employer (and not a member of an occupational
pension scheme); (3) not a member of either type of scheme. They are also
asked whether they currently pay into one or more private pension plans
and whether they are entitled to any other pensions from previous employ-
ers. Individuals who are self-employed, unemployed, or inactive (excluding
retirees) are first asked whether they currently pay into a PRSA. They are
then asked whether they currently pay into one or more private pension
plans and whether they are entitled to any other pensions from previous
employers.
Individuals seem to know whether they are currently paying into one or
more occupational or private pensions or not. Fifty-seven percent of employ-
ees are members of an occupational pension or PRSA organized through
their current employer; 41.8% are not members of either type of scheme;
1.1% report that they do not know; and 0.1% refuse to answer the question.
Similarly, 6% of those who are self-employed, unemployed, or inactive are
currently paying into a PRSA; 93.5% are not paying into such a scheme; 0.3%
does not know; and 0.2% refuses to answer this question.
Respondents who report that they are contributing to at least one of
these pensions are then asked a series of questions on the detailed provi-
sions of the scheme. For example, individuals are asked about their current
contributions to the scheme, the contributions made by their employers, and
the earliest age the pension plan allows them to retire. If they are contribut-
ing to more than one pension, they are asked about each pension separately.
Respondents are given the option to refuse to answer or to say that they “do
not know.”
In the analysis below, we use the “don’t know” responses as an indicator
of a lack of knowledge regarding the parameters of pension schemes in
which the respondents are enrolled. We focus on the questions regarding the
form in which the pension will be paid (lump sum and/or regular payment)
and how much the pension will pay out on retirement. When answering the
question about the amount to be paid, respondents are allowed to provide
either a euro amount or to express their expected payment as a percentage
of salary.
In the case of some questions on pension-related matters, respondents
are encouraged by the interviewer to check their pay slips; this approach
is taken, for example, when asking about the contributions they or their
employers make. This is done in an attempt to collect reliable data on pen-
sion contributions. Given that we cannot distinguish between those who
checked and did not check their payslips, we do not include the questions
on contributions in our analysis.
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Although the full TILDA sample includes over 8,500 people, we are only
looking at individuals who have not yet retired and who are covered by
some form of occupational or private pension. For this reason, the number
of observations used here is just under 2,000.
THE MODEL
Our interest is in exploring whether people are informed about the param-
eters of their pension schemes and how knowledge varies across different
people with different characteristics. To pursue this, our dependent variable
is equal to 1 if the individual provides a “don’t know” response to a pension
question and 0 otherwise. We then run probit regressions to see whether
individual characteristics explain the distributions of “don’t know.”
The specific questions used to create the dependent variable are as
follows: Respondents are asked to answer the following questions in relation
to the expected benefits of the occupational/personal pensions to which they
are contributing:
● Question 1: When you retire, how will funds from your pensions be paid?
● As a pension only (go to Question 2)
● As a lump-sum plus a pension (go to Questions 2 and 3)
● Do not know
● Refused
If respondents know how funds will be paid, they are then routed to
one (or both) of the following questions:
● Question 2: When you retire, before any tax deductions, how much do
you expect to receive each month from this pension?
● Percentage of salary
● Monthly amount
● Do not know
● Refused
● Question 3: How much do you expect to receive as a lump sum payment
from this pension scheme when you retire?
● Amount
● Do not know
● Refused
In our first probit model (Model 1), the dependent variable is equal to
1 if the respondent does not know the form and/or amount of her/his future
pension benefits, 0 otherwise. This occurs when the respondent answers
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“do not know” to any of the three questions reported above. In our second
probit model (Model 2), the dependent variable is restricted somewhat as it
is based on responses to Question 2 only and is equal to 1 if the respon-
dent cannot estimate his/her future monthly pension benefits, 0 otherwise.
The share of individuals who refuse to answer Questions 1, 2, or 3 is neg-
ligible. We assign them to the base category assuming that they know the
answer to the question(s) but refuse to report it. We first include individu-
als at work (employees and self-employed), in unemployment, or inactive.
We then restrict our sample to employees only.
If respondents have more than one pension and cannot estimate the
form/amount of at least one of the pensions, they are assigned to the “do not
know” category. This is based on the assumption that if they do not know the
expected benefits of at least one pension, they are not able fully to estimate
the resources they will have in retirement. As a robustness check, we also
estimate a model based on knowledge of the “most important” pension only.
Results (not reported but available on request) are in line with those reported
in the main model(s).
Turning to the explanatory variables, in the models including all respon-
dents covered by at least one occupational/private pension, we follow the
literature and control for:
● Current socioeconomic characteristics: single year of age; gender; mar-
ital status (married/cohabiting or not); highest qualification attained
(none/primary, secondary, tertiary); geographic location (Dublin, urban
outside Dublin, rural); labor market status (private sector employee, pub-
lic sector employee, self-employed [farmer], self-employed [non-farmer],
other [unemployed, permanently sick or disabled, looking after home, in
education or training, or other]); number of pensions the individual is cov-
ered by; number of children; and number of years spent working over the
lifetime.
● Socioeconomic characteristics in childhood: whether both respondents’
parents were working outside the home when the respondent was younger
than age 14 (yes or no).
● Health: self-reported health (excellent/very good, good, fair/poor); health
insurance (yes or no).
● Cognitive ability: word recall test in which 10 common words are pre-
sented orally and the respondent is asked to remember them after a short
delay.
If the results of the international literature are confirmed, we would
expect poorer knowledge among women and poorly educated individuals.
We would also expect better knowledge among those who have spent a
higher proportion of their lives at work and who are older, as they are
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closer to retirement and, hence, closer to the point in which they will stop
contributing and receive the pension benefit instead. We include our (lim-
ited) measure of cognitive ability because of the findings in previous studies
of links between cognition and general financial knowledge. We also include
a measure of health status on the expectation that people in poorer health
may pay closer attention to financial planning.
In the models focusing on employees only we also control for:
● Socioeconomic group: managers/professionals, non-manual, manual
skilled, semi-skilled, unskilled, unknown, or refused.
● Type of pension the individual is covered by: DB, DC, other (if individual
is covered by a pension with a previous employer or a private pension or
is unsure).
● Part-time employment (yes or no).
● Firm size (1–24, 25–199, 200+ employees).
Once again, if the results of the international literature are confirmed, we
would expect full-time employees and employees in higher socioeconomic
groups to be better informed.
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics. The first row of Table 1 shows
that 67.7% of respondents (and 68.2% of employees) do not know either the
form of payment or the amount (or both) of their future benefits. Also, 55.8%
of respondents (and 56.3% of employees) do not know their future monthly
pension benefits.
These figures are striking and one possible explanation that might sug-
gest itself is that the data were collected during the economic crisis when
uncertainty was high. While there might be some truth in this, a closer look
at the proportion of people in the “don’t know” category who are in DB
schemes is revealing. According to Table 1, 50% of those covered by a DB
pension do not know the amount they will receive, even as a percentage
of salary. Given that DB should be the least uncertain and most transparent
scheme, it would seem that the lack of knowledge is not limited to those in
DC or other schemes.
Looking more broadly at Table 1, we can see the characteristics of
those who are more likely to have imperfect knowledge. For dichotomous
variables, statistically significant differences are reported for each subgroup
with respect to the category omitted in the econometric model, which is the
reference category. For continuous variables, we report the mean value for
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those falling into the “do not know” category and, in square brackets, the
mean value for those falling into the “know” category. Statistically significant
differences in means between the two groups are reported.
In line with other studies (for example, Banks & Oldfield, 2007; Gustman
& Steinmeier, 2005), we find that younger individuals (those closer to age
50, which is the cutoff in TILDA), women, and poorly educated individu-
als are less likely to know about future benefits. Just over 70% of women
and 76% of those with primary or no education cannot estimate either the
form or the amount (or both) of their future benefits, compared to 66% of
men and 62.9% of those with tertiary education. Also, “imperfect knowl-
edge” is highest among those living in rural areas and for farmers. The share
of those with imperfect knowledge is lower for those falling into “other
labor market status” than for employees or self-employed. This is proba-
bly because those who have already withdrawn from the labor market or
are unlikely to return—for example homemakers and permanently sick and
disabled people—are more informed about their future pension benefits.
When focusing on employees only, we observe a clear gradient for
socioeconomic group. Managers/professionals are at lowest risk of imper-
fect knowledge, unskilled workers at highest. Also, the degree of imperfect
knowledge is significantly lower for those covered by a DB pension. This is
to be expected, although as noted above the level of “don’t know” responses
among those covered by DB schemes is still surprisingly high.
Regression Results
Table 2 presents results from probit models exploring the relation between
respondents’ imperfect knowledge of the form/amount of their future
pension benefits and the set of independent variables listed above. The
dependent variable in columns 1 and 3 takes on a value of 1 if the indi-
vidual answers “do not know” to any of the three questions outlined above.
The dependent variable in columns 2 and 4 takes on a value of 1 if the
individual answers “do not know” to question 2 (model 2). Columns 1 and
2 focus on all respondents, columns 3 and 4 on employees only. Marginal
effects and p values are reported in the table.
The results of columns 1 and 2 show that the probability of having
imperfect knowledge of future pension benefits is lower for individuals who
are older, are male, have a secondary or tertiary level of education, currently
work in the public sector, and are self-employed (other than farming) or in
the “other” category of labor market status. Another predictor of lower rates
of imperfect knowledge is having grown up in a family in which both par-
ents were working. We assume that this variable captures something about
the environment in dual-income homes, when the TILDA respondents were
young, where issues related to work may have been discussed more often.
Those covered by private health insurance also show a lower probability of
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having imperfect information. Here, we assume that having private health
insurance is an indicator of individuals who make careful decisions about
their finances and their futures.
The results are generally in line with those of the international literature
and with our initial assumptions. In particular, we observe a clear educa-
tional gradient with individuals with secondary (tertiary) education being
13.2% (16.6%) points less likely to have imperfect knowledge about the
form/amount (or both) of their future pension benefits. Those living in rural
areas and covered by a higher number of occupational/personal pensions
are more likely to have imperfect knowledge. Respondents who can recall a
higher number of words in the recall test do not seem to have better knowl-
edge. This is somewhat surprising because we expected a link between this
measure of cognitive ability and knowledge of pension parameters.
The results of columns 3 and 4 show that employees who are older,
are male, have secondary or tertiary levels of education, and are covered
by private health insurance are less likely to have imperfect knowledge of
their future benefits. We observe a clear gradient in socioeconomic status:
the probability of not being able to estimate the monthly amount of future
pension benefits is 22.9% points higher for unskilled workers than for man-
agers and professionals. Also, individuals covered by DC pensions are 15.8%
points more likely to have imperfect knowledge of the monthly amounts of
their future pension benefits than those covered by a DB pension.2
CONCLUSIONS
The lack of knowledge that has been uncovered of the basic parameters of
the pension plans in which people are enrolled is striking. Recalling that the
analysis is based on people older than 50 who are covered by some sort of
plan, it seems reasonable to assert that pension-related knowledge should
be higher in this group compared to others in the population. If this is the
case, then levels of knowledge in the remainder of the population would
be even lower. It is against this background that the Irish government, like
others, will place a greater onus on individuals to make provision for their
retirements.
As we have identified an information problem, the most straightforward
policy proposal would be for the state to provide more information. The
results in this paper suggest how some groups might be targeted. There is
evidence that women are less well-informed than men and that there are
socioeconomic gradients, whether we use education or occupation as the
indicator of socioeconomic status.
On the question of how best to provide information, a number of studies
in the United States have investigated whether financial education provided
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in the workplace can increase retirement saving and alter the investment
allocation of assets in retirement accounts (Bayer, Bernheim, & Scholz, 1996;
Bernheim & Garrett, 2003; Clark, d’Ambrosio, McDermed, & Sawant, 2006;
Clark & Schieber, 1998; Madrian & Shea, 2001). The findings of these stud-
ies are quite encouraging: They show that workers employed by firms that
offer financial education programs have higher participation rates and con-
tribution rates in DC plans (Bayer et al., 1996; Clark & Schieber, 1998) and
greater diversification in their retirement plan portfolios (Madrian & Shea,
2001). Clark and colleagues (2006) found that women are more respon-
sive to financial education programs carried out in the workplace and are
more likely to raise their desired retirement ages, increase their target income
replacement goals, and alter their savings behavior as a result of the finan-
cial education program. Bayer and colleagues (1996) showed that the effect
is typically stronger for non–highly compensated employees, that seminars
are the most effective type of communication, and that the effect is higher
for those who attend the seminars more frequently.
While there may be scope to provide information and coaching, the
question remains regarding whether pensions are an area where too great a
reliance on individual decision making may lead to unfavorable outcomes—
for individuals and for the state. In this context, policies that draw on a
greater role for the private sector but also include elements of compulsion
may be preferable to purely voluntary private arrangements. Some coun-
tries have experimented with a mild form of compulsion, notably through
auto-enrollment in occupational pensions with the option to opt out. New
Zealand has led the way in this regard and is being followed by the United
Kingdom. The experience in New Zealand has been successful, and if this is
mirrored in the United Kingdom, it may point the way for balancing individ-
ual responsibility for pension provision with a strong signal from the state
on the desirability of making such provision.
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NOTES
1. DB schemes provide the employee with a pension “promise” of a certain percentage of an
employee’s final salary. DC schemes offer a pension determined by the level of contributions invested
into a fund, its investment performance, and the charges levied.
2. As a final robustness check, we employ an additional model that focuses on imperfect knowl-
edge of lump sums only. We assign the value of 1 to the dependent variable if the individual does not
know how much she/he will receive as a lump sum when retired, 0 otherwise. Results are in line with
those of the main models presented in the paper. For example, the probability of not knowing the amount
of the lump sum is lower for individuals who are older, male, working in the public sector, and covered
by private health insurance and higher for employees who are unskilled and covered by a DC pension.
Results are available on request.
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